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Local Union Democracy 
In Search of Criteria 
John C. Anderson 
A vast number of criteria hâve been proposed as indicators 
of union democracy. Unfortunately, little agreement exists on 
the relative importance of those criteria. This article examines 
the interrelationships between several major components of 
union democracy: participation, électoral control, leadership 
responsiveness, and union control structure. Basedon theresults 
an integrated approach to union democracy is proposed. 
Despite the extensive interest of practitioners, académies, and policy 
makers in the démocratie government and administration of labor unions, 
to date little agreement exists on the définition of democracy and its com-
ponents'. As Cook emphasized "the questions of union democracy whether 
raised in Congress or by students of unionism hâve ail to rarely included 
précise discussion of the content of democracy in unions"2. With this lack 
* ANDERSON, John C , Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Business, Queen's 
University, Kingston, Canada. 
•* This research is part of a séries of investigations by the author on union democracy. It 
examines the intercorrelation of members' perceptions of the major dimensions of democracy 
and présents a new theoretical framework based on the results. For a study which examines the 
environmental and organizational déterminants of three criteria of local union democracy 
across a sample of 95 unions, see John C. Anderson, "A Comparative Analysis of Local 
Union Democracy", Industrial Relations, Vol. 17, No. 3, October, 1978, pp. 258-259. The 
déterminants of democracy in a union convention are examined in, John C. Anderson, "The 
Union Convention: An Examination of Limitations on Démocratie Décision Making", In-
dustrial Relations, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1977, pp. 379-398. Finally, the déterminants of participation 
in local unions are investigated in, John C. Anderson, "Local Union Participation: A Re-
examination", Industrial Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter, 1979, pp. 18-31. 
i The research reported hère is taken from the author's Masters thesis. I would like to 
gratefully acknowledge the coopération of the union. Computer funds were provided by the 
New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations. Lawrence K. Williams and Thomas 
A. Kochan provided support and assistance throughout the projeté. 
2 COOK, Alice, Union Democracy: Practice and Idéal, Ithaca, New York, Cornell 
University, 1963, p. 9. 
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of agreement, it becomes apparent that unions may be considered 
démocratie or undemocratic depending upon the choice of defining criteria. 
For example, Seidman et. al state that: 
...if it (democracy) is defined to mean active participation by members 
in forming policy, there is relatively little democracy in the labor move-
ment. If the test is responsiveness of leaders to the desires of members, 
an opposite conclusion is reached: most unions are démocratie at both 
the national and local levels.3. 
Moreover, if the various dimensions of the political process were delineated 
as additional criteria, each would represent a separate standard from which 
to evaluate the extent of democracy in unions. 
The présent paper reviews previous empirical studies in order to iden-
tify the major components of local union democracy. Those criteria are 
then operationalized and measured in four local unions. The objective of 
the analysis is to examine the interrelationships of the various criteria and 
their importance in explaning the variance in an overall measure of union 
democracy. 
REVIEW OF PAST RESEARCH 
Although a multitude of criteria of local union democracy hâve been 
proposed, the majority appear to emphasize the town meeting model of 
democracy which assumes that ail individuals are free to participate actively 
in the décision making processes of the governmental unit4. Thus, the level 
or extent of participation in union activities has been the most fréquent 
criterion used to assess the extent of union democracy. 
Participation has been stressed because it reflects the existence of ma-
jority rule at union meetings, a check on oligarchie or autocratie tendeneies 
of union leadership, and a means of sensitizing leaders to the problems of 
the membership5. Moreover, the focus of the research on the organiza-
3 SEIDMAN, Joël, J. LONDON, B. KARSH, and D. TAGLIACOZZO, The Worker 
Views his Union, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 185. 
4 WHYTE, W.F., "Building Better Organizational Models", in G. Somers (éd.), 
Essays in Industrial Relations Theory, Iowa, Iowa State University Press, 1969, pp. 109-121. 
5 COOK, op. cit., p. 10; G. Strauss and L. Sayles, "Patterns of Participation in Local 
Unions", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, October 1952, pp. 31-43. 
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tional, social, and individual correlates of member participation in union 
activities reveals the interest in finding ways in which to decrease member 
apathy6. 
Despite its research popularity, participation has been severly criticized 
as an ultimate indicator of démocratie government in local unions. 
Although participation has been studied with scales containing from one to 
twelve items, in most cases attendance at meetings and voting in élections 
hâve been considered indicative of participation. This raises the question of 
whether or not the measures adequately reflect the underlying construct of 
participation. Involvement of members in decision-making appears to hâve 
been displaced by behavioral involvement in union activities. With the ex-
ception of one item in the Tannenbaum and Kahn index7 (What things do 
you usually do at meetings?), there is a conspicuous lack of évaluation of 
the union members' behavior or impact on the décision making process of 
the local union. There seems to be an assumption that leaders will react to 
pressure and their power will be checked through the mère présence of a 
group of members. 
As local unions grow in size, the total membership may not feasibly be 
able to participate in union activities. Kovner and Lahne suggest that 
measures of formai participation fail to explain the total amount of 
membership involvement because gênerai membership meetings in many 
unions hâve been transformed into "delegate assemblies"8. Under this 
System the informai "shop society" is the basic unit from which members 
both gain information and*provide input into the formai décision making 
process. Issues are discussed among members of the shop society after 
which a représentative (member or steward) attends formai union meetings, 
registers the group's vote and then reports back to his constituents. Only 
under exceptional circumstances would ail members attend the formai 
meetings or activities. 
Thus, although research on participation may hâve been successful in 
identifying the factors influencing levels of member involvement in union 
6 For a review of the déterminants of individual participation in unions see: W. 
SPINRAD, "Correlates of Trade Union Participation: A Summary of the Literature", 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 25, April 1960, pp. 237-244 and M. PERLINE and V. 
LORENZ, "Factors Influencing Participation in Trade Union Activities", the American Jour-
nal of Economies and Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1970, pp. 425-437. 
7 TANNENBAUM, A., and R. KAHN, Participation in Union Locals, White Plains, 
New York, Row, Peterson and Co., 1958. 
8 KOVNER, J., and H. LAHNE, "Shop Society and the Union", Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, October 1953, pp. 3-14. 
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activities, there is some question as to whether the construct has been validly 
operationalized. Future research should attempt to tap the participation of 
members in the decision-making process of the union through both infor-
mai and formai channels9. 
A second criterion potentially useful as an indicator of local union 
democracy deals with the électoral process. However, little systematic em-
pirical research has focused on the électoral process within local unions. 
Possibly this is because the législative function is carried out at local union 
meetings and as such studies of participation hâve encompassed the élec-
toral process. The majority of participation research has included in-
dividual voting behavior in their scales, but little else about that process has 
been examined10. 
Investigations which hâve been examined élections at the local level 
hâve considered variables similar to those examined at the national level: 
closeness of élections, tenure of leadership, and whether or not élections 
were contested. For example, Strauss and Sayles found that active compéti-
tion existed for top local positions but that it was significantly lower for 
steward and other minor positions11. Fréquent changes in local officers and 
delegates to national conventions were also discovered in a study of the 
American Flint Glass Workers Union12. Lipset et. al. reported vigorous 
campaigns involving three or more candidates in the New York local of the 
ITU, with élections usually being extremely close13. Finally, Faunce found 
substantial compétition for delegate positions to the UAW convention; with 
forty-five percent of the delegates being elected for the first time14. 
In addition to those criteria directly associated with the actual élection 
results, other dimensions of the political process hâve been delineated as im-
9 For a broader view of participation see J. ANDERSON, "Local Union Participation: 
A Re-examination", Industrial Relations, Vol. 19, No. 1, February 1979. 
10 The majority of the research on the political process in unions has focused on the na-
tional level. See for instance, J.D. EDELSTEIN and M. WARNER, Comparative Union 
Democracy, New York: Wiley, 1976; E. GINSBERG, "American Labor Leaders: Time in Of-
fice", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, April 1948, pp. 282-293; P. 
TAFT, "Opposition to Union Officers in Elections", Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol. 
63, No. 2, 1944, pp. 246-264. 
n STRAUSS, G., and L. SAYLES, "Occupation and the Sélection of Local Union Of-
ficers", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 58, No. 6, December 1953, pp. 585-591. 
12 STEEL, H., "Tenure of Leadership in the American Flint Glass Workers' Union", 
Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol. 65, No. 1, 1951, pp. 130-137. 
13 LIPSET, S., M. TROW, and J. COLEMAN, Union Democracy, Garden City, New 
York, Anchor Books, 1956. 
14 FAUNCE, W., "Size of Locals and Union Democracy", American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 67, No. 2, April 1962, pp. 291-298. 
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portant. The availability of individuals to the nomination procédure, 
freedom to campaign, openness of communication channels and honesty of 
élections hâve ail been mentioned as criteria of électoral democracy in local 
unions. 
The third major criterion to be reviewed is leadership responsiveness to 
membership demands. Responsiveness as a criterion of democracy reflects 
the responsibility and accountability of the leaders to the members15. Even a 
union which has ail of the procédural trapping of internai democracy may 
not be démocratie if the elected officiais ignore the suggestions and 
demands of their constituents. Moreover, the fact that the union hierarchy 
meets the goals of members without their formai participation, no matter 
how their interests were determined may not be considered démocratie16. 
Michels has argued that over time the leadership become more and more 
concerned with maintaining their own positions and control over the 
organization, and less concerned with the interests of the membership. In-
evitably, the union is then controlled by a few leaders pursuing their self in-
terests. Thus, responsiveness of the leadership is a key condition which may 
reduce the likelihood of the "iron law of oligarchy"17. 
The responsiveness criterion has been critieized as inadéquate because 
"it is impossible to assess the responsiveness of union leaders to their consti-
tuents except through the électoral process, for élections provide the only 
means of discovering majority opinion''18. Furthermore, Marcus points out 
that it is relatively easy for the leaders to manipulate the perception of the 
membership so that responsiveness measures may assess no more than the 
effective influence of union officiais19. 
Others feel that either the membership are an uneducated mass20 or that 
it is not "clear that demands pressed by the gênerai membership are sounder 
economically or socially than those sponsored by the union officiais who 
hâve had an opportunity to become acquainted with the employer's pro-
15 MAGRATH, C.P., "Democracy in Overalls: The Futile Quest for Union 
Democracy", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, July 1959, pp. 503-525. 
16 For a similar approach by management see the foliowing discussion of boulwarism, 
W.F. WHYTE, Men at Work, Homewood, Illinois, Dorsey Press, 1961. 
17 MICHELS, R., Political Parties, Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press, 1949. 
18 MARTIN, R., "Union Democracy: An Explanatory Framework", Sociology, Vol. 2, 
No. 3, September 1968, p. 206. 
19 MARCUS, P., "Union Conventions and Executive Boards: A Formai Analysis of 
Organizational Structure", American SociologicalReview, Vol. 31, No. 1, February 1966, pp. 
61-70. 
20 H O X I E , R., Trade Unionism in the United States, New York, Apple ton, 1923. 
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blems"21. Both views see leaders in a much better position in terms of both 
the éducation and expérience required to make intelligent décisions, and 
hence, both participation and responsiveness become important 
(presumably this accentuâtes the need for électoral democracy). 
No literature was found which was related directly to the respon-
siveness of officiais. However, research on contract rejections;22 leader 
prédictions of member pay and benefit préférences;23 or préférences for in-
trinsic versus extrinsic job characteristics;24 and leaders' attitudes towards 
members25 ail tend to argue for the gap between members and leaders 
described by Michels as the "iron law of oligarchy"26. The existence of such 
a gap may limit the ability of union leaders to be responsive to the demands 
of the local union's membership. 
A final indicator of local union democracy is the "control graph" 
developed by Tannenbaum and Kahn27. This gênerai criterion évaluâtes the 
relative amount of say and influence each of the significant groups in the 
union hierarchy (eg. members, stewards, leadership) hâve over the way the 
local union is run. Control is defined as "the capacity to manipulate 
available means for the satisfaction of needs"28. Four models of control are 
presented based on which group or groups hâve the major influence in déci-
sion making: démocratie, autocratie or oligarchie, laissez-faire or anarchie, 
and polyarchic. The four fold typology is based not only on the distribution 
of control but also on the total amount of control held by ail groups. That 
is, anarchie control refers to a relatively equal distribution of control among 
21 STEELE, H., "Membership Participation in the American Flint Glass Workers 
Union", The Southern Economie Journal, Vol. 18, July 1951, p. 83. 
22 BURKE, D . , and L. RUBIN, ' i s Contract Rejection a Major Collective Bargaining 
P r o b l e m ? " Industrialand Labor Relations Review, Vol. 26, No . 4, January 1973, pp . 820-833. 
23 L A W L E R , E. , and E. LEVIN, " U n i o n Officers' Perceptions of Members ' Pay 
Préférences" , Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 21 , No . 4, 1968, pp . 509-517; J . 
HOWELLS and P. BROSNAN, "The Ability to Predict Workers' Préférences: A Research 
Exercise", Human Relations, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1972, pp. 265-281. 
24 G L U S K I N O S , U. , and B. K E S T E L M A N , " M a n a g e m e n t and Labor Leaders ' Percep-
tion of Worker Needs as Compared with Self-Report and N e e d s " , PersonnelPsychology, Vol. 
24, N o . 2, Summer , 1971, pp . 239-246. 
25 LANDSBERGER, H., and C. HULIN, "A Problem for Union Democracy: Officers' 
Attitudes Toward Union Members", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, 
April 1961, pp. 419-431; R. MILES and J. RITCHIE, "Leadership Attitudes Among Union 
Officiais", Industrial Relations, Vol. 7, No. 1, February 1968, pp. 108-117. 
26 M I C H E L S , op. cit. 
27 TANNENBAUM and KAHN, op. cit. 
28 Ib id , p . 127. 
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groups with a low total control, while polyarchic is also equal distribution 
but with a high level of total control. 
The control graph has been found to be highly reliable technique for 
assessing the overall level of démocratie organization in local unions. 
Moreover, it was found to be related to several other measures of union 
democracy. The authors discovered that: (i) the level of membership par-
ticipation is correlated with the existence of a démocratie control structure; 
(ii) démocratie control is related to member interest in broad social goals 
while no relationship was discovered to immédiate or spécifie goals; and (iii) 
total control is related to the amount of union-management conflict and ef-
fectiveness of the union29. 
A single caveat was added, however, concerning the interprétation of 
the control graph; "although the membership as a whole ranks high on con-
trol curves (démocratie control), this does not imply that each member in-
dividually has more influence than each officer individually"30. Moreover, 
Perrow finds that no effort has been made to détermine how officiai policy 
or actual behavior are correlated with attitudes about "say and 
influence"31. The results may also vary if différent levels and numbers of 
organizations (or groups) are rated32. Thus, research in the future will need 
to be aware of the limitations of the control graph as a measure of local 
union democracy. 
A discussion of the above four major sets of criteria of local union 
democracy alone illustrâtes the need to consider interrelational approaches 
to the union democracy construct. Each of the criteria are inherently related 
to the others and although each provides a separate standard on which to 
assess the extent of union democracy, no single measure can adequately 
represent the démocratie process. 
29 Ibid, See also C. SMITH and R. TANNENBAUM, "Organizational Control Struc-
ture; A Comparative Analysis", Human Relations, Vol. 16, No. 4, April 1963, pp. 299-316. 
30 TANNENBAUM and KAHN, op. cit., p. 133. 
31 PERROW, C , "Control and Bureaucracy", Paper presented at New York State 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations mini-conference on power, Cornell University, 
December 6, 1974. 
32 PENNINGS, J., "A Note on the Measurement of Power in Organizations", Working 
Paper No. 43-73-74, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1974. 
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METHOD 
Sam pie 
Questionnaires were distributed to a random sample of union members 
in each of four locals of a public sector union in one city in western Canada. 
The locals were chosen to provide a représentative range of occupational 
groups (manual to professional) represented by the union. The overall 
response rate was approximately 40 percent33. 
Local 1 was the largest local studied with approximately 2,500 
members. The vast majority of the membership work in manual or semi-
skilled jobs in government health and mental institutions. About half of the 
members hâve had prior exposure to unions. Membership meetings in the 
local are attended mainly by stewards (over ten percent of the membership 
hold this position) and as such the meetings etc. as delegate bodies. 
Local 2 has a membership of 500 professional workers in the area of 
social, health, and dietary services. Few of the members had any association 
with the labor movement previously although most had belonged to profes-
sional associations. Meetings are well attended by the gênerai membership 
and the local holds separate steward meetings. 
Local 3 has a membership of approximately 350 individuals, the ma-
jority of which are involved in either manual labor of the opération of 
trucks or heavy equipment. Between 50 and 75 percent hâve had prior ex-
périence with unions. Meetings are attended mainly by stewards (80 percent) 
who are elected on a régional basis. 
Local 4 has a membership of approximately 500 individuals who 
engage in engineering, technical, and inspectional occupations. Only the in-
spectors hâve had any past union affiliations, mainly with craft unions. 
Meetings are also attended primarily by stewards. 
For purposes of the présent analysis respondents for ail locals were 
combined into a single sample (n= 169). Ail locals were governed by the 
same constitution and thus, they tend to hâve similar leadership and ad-
ministrative structures. Ail leaders are part-time and unpaid. Collective 
bargaining occurs at the provincial level resulting in a master collective 
33 The lower response rates reported hère are less of a problem than in représentative 
surveys as the non respondents appear to be the less informed and inactive members of the 
union. Since the concept examined hère may be more familiar to activitist's their responses are 
probably more accurate than would be those of the inactive member. 
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agreement with wage suppléments at the occupational (province wide) level. 
Thus, it is totally removed from the local union level, except that the local 
président is involved, with other local présidents representing the same oc-
cupations, in negotiating wage suppléments. The local union is mainly 
responsible for administering the collective agreement. The unions also 
operate in the same géographie area under the same économie, légal and 
political environments. Thèse facts, along with an analysis of variance 
which revealed few significant différences on item responses across locals 
justify the combination of responses across locals. It should be noted that 
generalizations of the results to other types of unions, especially larger or 
smaller, industrial, or private sector may be inappropriate. Moreover, the 
results apply to local unions, and the relationship of the local to its national 
union (ie., the amount of autonomy granted the local) may be an important 
influence on local union democracy. 
Measures 
Participation in union activities: Respondents were asked to complète a 
séries of items related to this form of participation which were combined in-
to two indices. Meeting attendance which was a total of the number of 
regular and spécial meetings attended during the past year, and other 
behavioral participation which was comprised of responses to activity at 
union meetings, union committee membership, union office, years in of-
fice, voting and campaigning in local élections, and reading the union 
newspaper regularly. 
Informai participation: In order to crudely operationalize Kovner and 
Lahne's notions,34 respondents were asked to check in which of the follow-
ing ways they would take action when they had a suggestion or complaint to 
make: 1) go to a local meeting, 2) find a leader at work and tell him, 3) get a 
steward to tell the leaders, 4) contact a staff représentative, 5) get a friend to 
bring it up at a local meeting, 6) write a letter to the union and 7) nothing. In 
order to détermine the relative importance of informai methods (ail except 
number 1) a ratio of informai approaches to formai methods of participa-
tion was computed by totally the number of informai techniques used and 
dividing that by whether or not the individual used the formai method of 
participation (going to a meeting). 
Participation in decision-making: In order to more directly address the 
participation construct individuals were asked whether they took part in 
34 KOVNER and LAHNE, op. cit. 
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décisions over eleven issues and how much influence they had over each 
décision. The latter was measured on a four point scale ranging from little 
or no influence to very strong influence. Two indices were computed: 1) 
total number of décisions participated in (Cronbach's alpha = .64) and 2) 
total influence over décisions (Cronbach's alpha = .89). The eleven déci-
sion areas were: contract proposais, electing local, component, and national 
leaders, constitutional changes, autonomy, union policy, use of union 
funds, hiring union staff, discipline of members and accepting and rejecting 
contracts. 
Electoralprocess democracy. Individuals were asked to respond to five 
items on a six point Likert type scale ranging from strongly agrée to strongly 
disagree. An index was calculated by summing responses to the items which 
examined: (1) perceived openness of the nomination procédure; (2) perceiv-
ed chances of winning; (3) perceived favoratism by union executives for par-
ticular candidates; (4) perceived availability of good candidates for élec-
tions; and (5) perceived closeness of élections (Cronbach's alpha = .62). 
Leadership responsiveness: Individuals were asked to indicate how 
responsive leaders were to their demands on each of twelve issues (the eleven 
in participation plus grievance processing). A four point scale was used 
ranging from very unresponsive to very responsive. An index was computed 
by summing across issues (Cronbach's alpha = .92). 
Union control structure: A more gênerai measure of union democracy, 
control structure was also inclùded to be used as a dépendent variable in the 
corrélation and régression analyses. This measure is adapted from the work 
of Tannenbaum and Kahn35. The scale asks how much "say and influence" 
each of six groups hâve over the way the union is run, on a four point scale 
ranging from little or no to very strong. An index was computed by dividing 
the response about the influence of the membership group by the total con-
trol of the other five groups. This ratio was chosen as it best reflects the 
relative control of members; the essence of democracy. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
The means, standard déviations, and possible range of values for each 
of the democracy criterion scales are presented in Table 1. An examination 
of the results illustrâtes that depending on the criterion chosen, a local 
35 TANNENBAUM and KAHN, op. cit. 
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union may actually be considered more or less démocratie. For instance, 
measures of meeting attendance, other behavioral participation, informai 
participation, number of décisions in which members are involved, 
members' influence over décisions, and union control structure ail suggest 
that the locals are basically undemocratic. That is, on average members at-
tended only four of eighteen meetings; were involved in only a few more 
than two of seven other activities; used few informai channels; and on 
average only participated in three of eleven décisions. On the other hand, 
the leadership appears to be perceived as being moderately responsive to 
members' wishes and members seem to hâve some degree of control over 
the électoral process of the local unions. However, in an absolute sensé the 
majority of the criteria fail to even reach the midpoint on the scale which 
suggests that overall the union may be relatively low on democracy36. 
TABLE 1 
Means, Standard Déviation and Minimum and Maximum Values 
for Democracy Criterion Scales 
Democracy Criterion Scales Number 
of items 
Mean Standard Déviation Range of Values 
Meeting attendance 2 4.04 5.13 Oto 18 
Other behavioral participation 1 2.44 1.35 0 t o 7 
Informai participation (ratio) 6 0.34 0.90 Oto 6 
Number of décisions 11 3.15 2.80 Oto 11 
Influence over décisions 11 16.45 5.92 11 to 44 
Electoral control (R) 6 14.92 4.10 5 t o 3 0 
Leadership responsiveness 12 34.66 7.78 12 to 48 
Union control structure (ratio) 6 0.13 0.10 0.05 to 0.80 
Note: R indicates reverse scoring, a low value indicates a great deal of électoral control. 
A supplementary analysis of the response frequencies to the items com-
prising each of the scales provided some interesting information about 
members' conception of democracy. A large proportion of respondents 
reported being involved in union activities; union décision making pro-
cesses; having more influence over décisions; and having responsive leaders 
under conditions where little initiative or action was required on the part of 
36 ETZIONI, A., "Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A Critique and Sugges-
tion", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2, June 1960, pp. 257-278 argues that we 
hâve to be cautious in labelling an organization ineffective (or this case undemocratic) when 
comparing its performance to an idéal state as it is always likely to look bad. The more impor-
tant question is under what conditions are unions more or less démocratie. 
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the member. That is, while almost one hundred percent of the respondents 
read the union newspaper and voted in élections, few campaigned in élec-
tions or served on union committees. Moreover, members reported par-
ticipating in décisions, having influence over them, or seeing leaders as 
responsive on issues where structural mechanisms existed for obtaining in-
put - contract proposais, élections, gênerai union policy, and accepting or 
rejecting contracts. Thus, it appears that although a large majority of the 
membership may exercise their inaliénable right to inactivity, where little ac-
tion is required or where structural mechanisms exist democracy is likely to 
be greater. 
Zero-Order Corrélation Analysis 
Given that différent criteria produce varying prédictions concerning 
local union democracy, it is important to examine the relationships among 
criteria. The corrélations are presented in Table 2. Each criterion will be 
discussed separately. 
TABLE 2 
Intercorrelation Matric of Democracy Criterion Scales 
Democracy Criterion Sca/e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Meeting attendance 
2. Other behavioral 
participation 
3. Informai participation 
4. Number of décisions 
5. Influence over décisions 
6. Electoral control (R) 
7. Leadership responsiveness 
8. Union control structure 
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01 
Note: Significance levels vary because of missing data. 
Note: R indicates reverse scoring, a low value indicates a great deal of électoral control. 
The pattern of corrélations of participation measures suggest the 
possibility of a three stage model. The three behavioral participation 
measures (meetings, other participation, and informai participation) are 
positively and significantly related. The more meetings that members at-
tend, the more involved members are in other union activities, and the more 
informai methods of participation used by members, the greater the number 
of décisions participated in by the members. Moreover, attending meetings, 
involvement in other activities and participating in union décisions ail 
.60** 
.20** .28** 
.41** .53** .26** 
.43** .41** .03 .45** 
-.23** -.31** -.03 -.23** -.29** 
.16 .09 .03 .11 .39** -.41** 
.12 .04 .01 .16* .19* -.15 .29** 
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significantly increase the influence of members over décisions. It is in-
teresting that although informai participation increases the number of déci-
sions in which members participate, it has no effect on influence over déci-
sions. This supports the notion that the shop society may help members pro-
vide input into the démocratie décision making processes but only may in-
crease the influence of the représentative actually involved in the formai 
process (eg. steward). Finally, the greater the number of décisions par-
ticipated in and the greater the members' influence over décisions, the more 
démocratie the union control structure. 
The extent of democracy in the électoral process of the local union is 
also significantly related to the various participation measures (with the ex-
ception of informai participation). It appears that the more active a member 
is in both behavioral activities and the décision making process, the more 
likely he is to perceive the union's political process as accessible and vital. 
Interestingly, the électoral control criterion is not significantly related to the 
control structure of the union. However, the corrélation is in the predicted 
direction and approaches significance (p <.10). 
The results related to leadership responsiveness support the contentions 
of previous industrial relations theorists. Measures of behavioral participa-
tion and décisions participated in are not related to responsiveness. 
However, under conditions were members hâve influence over décisions 
and électoral control, union leadership are more likely to be responsive. 
Thus, as others hâve proposed leaders will be responsive when they are forc-
ed to by influencial members or where the probability of re-election is ques-
tioned by the vitality of the électoral process. Leadership responsiveness 
also has the strongest association with union control structure; the more 
responsive the leadership, the more démocratie the control structure of the 
local union. 
The overall pattern of results suggest that the union democracy con-
struct may be represented as a multistage process as depicted in Figure 1. 
This conceptual framework is necessarily a simplified représentation as it 
does not include ail subdimensions of the variables. However, it does il-
lustrate the relationships found in the correlational analysis and also sug-
gests some of the direct and indirect effects of the variables on each set of 
criteria. 
FIGURE 1 
The Union Democracy Process 
Participation in — . ^ 
Behavioral ^ ^ - ^ " ^ Décision Making «*. " ** Union Control 
Participation - ^ ^ " **• L e a d e r s h l P — > Structure 
Responsiveness Electoral Control 
444 R E L A T I O N S INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 34. NO 3 (1979) 
Régression Analysis 
Unfortunately the above model can not be directly testée! in this 
research as it is impossible to meet the recursive assumptions necessary to 
perform path analysis. That is, many of the relationships may be reciprocal 
rather than causal in nature (e.g., members may hâve more influence 
because leaders are more responsive or vice versa). Therefore, in order to 
examine the combined and independent effects of the democracy criterion 
scales on union control structure multiple régression analysis was ernployed. 
Furthermore, as no a priori theoretical basis existed to détermine the order 
of entry of variables into the régression équation (the model above was data 
based), stepwise régression was used. In order to once again check for an ef-
fect of the combination of locals in the analysis, a séries of dummy variables 
representing each local were entered last. Listwise deletion of data was 
used37. 
Entering six independent variables (criteria of local union democracy) 
and three dummy variables in the régression équation explained approx-
imately fifty-one percent of the variance in union control structure. 
However, an examination of the adjusted R2 indicates the optimal model 
(the highest adjusted R2) is found after the entry of the fifth variable. Also, 
only the first four variables significantly add to the variance explained in the 
dépendent variable38. 
Overall, the analysis suggests that the members' influence over déci-
sions is the most important predictor of union control structure when other 
criteria are held constant. That is, the more influence that members hâve 
over important local union décisions, the more démocratie the distribution 
of control among levels in the union hierarchy. The next variable, informai 
participation accounts for an additional seven percent of the variance and 
indicates that the more informai methods available to the mernber, the 
greater the relative influence of the membership in the way the union is run. 
37 Before a t tempt ing the régression analysis three checks were made on the da ta . 
Multicollinearity did not appear to be a problem as ail corrélat ions were at .60 or below. 
However , the use of listwise ra ther than pairwise deletion resulted in réduct ion in the size of the 
sample . T o check for différences in the resulting sample , t-tests were computed between the 
means on the scales as calculated with listwise and pairwise deletion of da ta . The listwise 
resulted in a sample of members a t tending significantly more meetings, part icipating more in 
other activities and a greater number of décisions. N o other variables were significantly dif-
férent. 
38 The formula for significant addi t ion to variance explained of a variable added to a 
régression équat ion was taken from F . K E R L I N G E R and E. P E D H A Z U R , Multiple Régres-
sion in Behavioral Research, New York, Hol t , Rinehar t , Wins ton , 1973. 
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However, the beta coefficient only approaches significance at the ten per-
cent level. The other behavioral activities index enters third and significant-
ly adds to the explanation of union control structure. Interestingly, the beta 
weight indicates the relationship is négative. That is, holding other criteria 
constant, an increase in participation on other types of behavioral activities 
such as holding office or serving on committees results in a decrease in 
relative member influence. This finding may be due to the fact that in-
dividuals tend to overestimate the influence of their own group (e.g., 
steward, local executive, etc.) and thus the decrease in relative member in-
fluence reported hère may be due to the fact that stewards and leaders are 
more likely to hâve high scores on this scale. Leadership responsiveness is 
the final variable to add significantly to the équation although the standar-
dized régression coefficient only approaches significance at the ten percent 
level. Thus, the more responsive local union leaders are to the interest of the 
membership on important issues, the more démocratie the local union con-
trol structure. 
TABLE 3 
Stepwise Régression of Union Control Structure on 
Democracy Criterion Scales 
Democracy Criterion Scales Standardized Adjusted Change in 
Beta R2 Adjusted R2 
Influence over décisions Ml** .26 .26** 
Informai participation .218 .31 .05** 
Other behavioral participation -.433** .36 .05** 
Leadership responsiveness .256 .38 .02* 
Number of décisions .214 .40 .02 
Meeting attendance .122 .40 .00 
Electoral control -.001 .38 -.02 
Local 3 .168 .37 -.01 
Local 2 .159 .36 -.01 
Local 1 .069 .35 -.01 
Degrees of Freedom 10,158 
Overall F Value 2.88** 
R2 .51(.35) 
Note: *p < . 1 0 
**p < . 0 5 
***p <.01 
The number of décisions in which members participate, meeting atten-
dance, électoral control and the local union dummy variables do not make a 
significant addition to explanation of the dépendent variable. Thus, when 
the variance due to the first four variables is controlled, others are not im-
portant. 
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The régression analysis provides only partial support for the concep-
tual framework presented in Figure 1. According to that model influence in 
décision making and leadership responsiveness should hâve been important 
predictors of union control structure with other variables having less impor-
tance. Both were significant in the analysis. However, neither significant 
participation measure (i.e., behavioral and informai) would hâve been 
predicted. The négative relationship of the other behavioral activities can 
possibly be explained as a measurement artifact but the interesting resuit is 
the importance of informai methods of participation in the démocratie 
nature of union control structure. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
A multitude of définitions hâve been proposed for the union 
democracy construct. At the local union level, participation in union ac-
tivities; informai participation through the shop society; leadership respon-
siveness to union members' demands; électoral control and a plethora of 
more spécifie indicators hâve been delineated as criteria for evaluating the 
extent of democracy. Thèse criteria as well as some of their subdimensions 
were examined in this research. The results provide some interesting im-
plications for theory and research on union democracy. 
First, past research on union democracy has conceived of the construct 
in structural terms. Even Tannenbaum and Kahn,39 rather than talking 
about the dynamics of the influence process, name their ultimate measure 
the "control graph", a structural depiction of an organization. In addition, 
measurement of the various criteria has been accomplished by collecting 
outeome measures. That is, meeting attendance figures are considered in-
dicative of participation (which started off as participation in décision mak-
ing via a town meeting model of democracy and ended up as involvement in 
various activities); votes, tenure, turnover, and opposition are ail con-
sidered indicative of électoral control and the political process; and contract 
rejections or defeat of union officiais are supposed to be représentative of 
the responsiveness of leaders to the membership of the local union. 
Although ail of thèse criteria and their operational measures may set 
out a séries of limiting conditions for the existence of democracy, there is 
the possibility that they miss the essence of the union democracy construct. 
Attendance figures may tell us little more than how many friends t ne leaders 
39 TANNENBAUM and KAHN, op. cit. 
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have and fail to indicate the extent to which the meeting acts as a forum for 
debate and démocratie decision-making. Despite the fact that attendance 
appears to rise and fall depending on the issue or climate, no indication is 
provided of how tightly agendas are controlled; how the floor is 
manipulated by the chair; or the directionality of information and décision 
flow in local union meetings. The same analysis or criticism is true for each 
of the criteria. 
Turnover of union officiais may tell us about organizational mobility, 
retirement, or death but not necessarily about the challenges to top leader-
ship, the struggle in campaigns or the ability of members to factionalize and 
develop a viable candidate; nor does opposition or lack of it in élections 
necessarily provide this information. Even the closeness of élections may be 
dépendent on other unmeasured aspect of the political process; for exam-
ple, the status of the candidates (incumbent versus new candidates) or the 
voting System used. 
The same set of questions can be raised about contract rejections and 
leadership responsiveness. Thus, it appears that in the search for convenient 
measures, past research has not overwhelmingly succeeded in assessing the 
construct of local union democracy. However, the above critiques and the 
présent research suggest one possible framework for the conceptualization 
of the construct. 
First, rather than conceiving of democracy in structural terms, it may 
be more appropriate to think of it as a dynamic process: the process by 
which members, individually or collectively make their interests, desires, 
and demands known to the leadership and subsequently have them acted 
upon (responsiveness). The results of the présent research suggest that in-
fluence over important union décisions and the manner in which influence is 
obtained and exercised may be the core of the démocratie process in labor 
unions. 
From the theoretical and empirical research in the field of organiza-
tional behavior, we know that a member's ability to influence organiza-
tional functioning may dérive from: the formai structure of the union; the 
ability of the individual to reward or sanction other's behavior; the 
characteristics of the individual; or the knowledge and expertise of the 
member40. Thus, the development of a model of the union democracy con-
40 ETZIONI, A., A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, New York, The 
Free Press, 1961; J. FRENCH and B. RAVEN, "The Bases of Social Power", in D. CART-
WRIGHT and A. ZANDER (eds.), Group Dynamics: Research and Theory, 2nd édition, 
Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1960, pp. 607-623. 
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struct must be expanded beyond the formai authority attributed to actors 
because of their position in the union hierarchy to include other sources of 
influence (power). 
The action channels available to the members hâve also been stressed as 
important to the décision making process. That is, influence may be exercis-
ed or attempted within, either or both, the formai and informai channels of 
décision making. Past research on local union democracy has focused 
almost solely upon the rôle of formai channels. Influence has been 
characterized as being used within the confines of union meetings or union 
élections. Moreover, the influence has been represented by votes on motions 
at the union meeting, for candidates in élections, on new collective 
agreements. Little, if any, research has been addressed to the informai 
channels; e.g., informai member meetings at work, téléphone calls, corner-
ing stewards, officers or staff représentatives, use of pétitions, internai 
boycotts or wildcats against the unions, formation of interest groups or 
caucuses and so on. However, the results of corrélation and régression 
analyses reported hère emphasize the importance of the use of methods of 
informai participation in local union democracy. 
In short, the ultimate test of the extent of union democracy is whether 
individual members within the union are able to influence décisions that 
they perceive to affect their vital interests, goals or welfare. Are members 
able to mobilize enough influence or power to participate in and affect the 
décisions that are of greatest concern to them, or is power so concentrated 
within the hands of the leadership or some minority faction so as to 
preclude effective participation and conflict resolution through the 
''démocratie" process? Such an approach requires more emphasis on the 
way in which conflicting interests or goals are resolved within the policy 
making process of unions. The structural characteristics and perhaps 
behavioral participation variables might be seen as conditions which 
facilitate or hinder the functioning of a démocratie process within unions, 
however, they should not be accepted by themselves as measures of the 
phenomenon called union democracy. Thus, future research on union 
democracy will need to focus directly on the décision making process, as 
difficult as that may be. 
Therefore, the critical challenge for future research on union 
democracy lies in measuring the décision making processes within unions in 
a way that can effectively tap this important construct. Only then can we 
confidently begin to understand the factors shaping democracy in unions 
and perhaps even begin to explore the ultimate policy issue, namely the con-
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séquences of more or less union democracy on the goals of the individual 
member, the effectiveness of the union as a total organization and on other 
dépendent variables of interest in industrial relations. 
Un essai d'analyse de la démocratie syndicale 
Les recherches et les études théoriques dans le domaine des relations de travail 
ont proposé de nombreux critères pour mesurer le degré de vie démocratique à l'in-
térieur d'un syndicat. Malheureusement, il n'y a guère d'accord sur la pertinence ou 
l'importance de ces différents critères. Résultat: un syndicat peut être dit démocrati-
que ou non selon les critères choisis. L'objet de l'article est d'examiner les interrela-
tions entre quatre catégories de critères d'évaluation du degré de démocratie syndi-
cale. 
Un critère important utilisé dans le passé pour mesurer le caractère démocrati-
que d'un syndicat était le degré d'engagement des membres dans l'activité syndicale. 
On s'est demandé, cependant, si l'engagement dans l'activité syndicale correspond 
véritablement à la vraie notion de participation. En conséquence, dans la présente 
recherche, on tient compte, non seulement de l'engagement dans l'activité syndicale, 
mais aussi de la mesure de participation des membres dans les décisions importantes 
du syndicat et de leur influence sur la prise des décisions. Kovner et Lahne ont aussi 
critiqué les mesures de participation parce qu'elles se concentrent uniquement sur les 
moyens d'engagement, c'est-à-dire les assemblées syndicales. Ils laissent entendre 
que souvent se forment des «groupes d'usines» où les membres discutent des ques-
tions syndicales, alors qu'un seul délégué assiste aux assemblées, enregistre le vote du 
groupe pour ensuite lui faire rapport. C'est pourquoi il a semblé bon d'inclure dans 
la recherche cette forme de participation informelle. 
Une deuxième catégorie de critères utilisés pour mesurer le degré de démocratie 
syndicale a trait au processus des élections. De ce point de vue, la recherche s'in-
téresse aux modalités de vote, au roulement des dirigeants, aux lettres électorales et à 
l'institutionalisation d'une opposition. Plus le processus électoral est vivant, plus le 
syndicat apparaît démocratique. 
Un troisième critère important de la démocratie au sein d'un syndicat repose sur 
le degré de sensibilisation des dirigeants à l'égard des intérêts des membres. Même si 
les membres participent à la vie du syndicat et exercent une influence grâce au pro-
cessus d'élections, si les dirigeants se désintéressent des membres, le syndicat n'est 
pas vraiment démocratique. Plus les dirigeants sont intéressés aux intérêts des mem-
bres quand il s'agit de prendre les décisions majeures qui concernent le syndicat, plus 
ce dernier est démocratique. 
Selon Tannenbaum et Kahn la structure du syndicat constitue un indice du 
degré de démocratie que l'on y trouve. Cette mesure examine l'étendue de la liberté 
d'expression et de l'influence que les groupes principaux à l'intérieur du syndicat 
(membres, délégués d'usine, comités divers et bureau de direction) ont sur la façon 
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dont il est dirigé. Quatre types de structures de contrôle sont proposés, fondés selon 
la distribution et la somme totale de contrôle qui sera démocratique, oligarchique, 
anarchique ou polyarchique. Une structure de contrôle démocratique est celle où les 
membres du syndicat ont beaucoup d'influence sur la façon dont le syndicat est 
dirigé par rapport aux autres groupes de la hiérarchie syndicale. La mesure de Tan-
nenbaum et de Kahn est aussi incluse dans cette étude en tant que critère de 
démocratie syndicale. 
À ces fins, des questionnaires ont été distribués à quatre syndicats du secteur 
public d'une ville dans l'Ouest canadien. Ces syndicats furent choisis parce qu'ils 
représentaient les principaux groupes tant manuel, administratif, technique que pro-
fessionnel. Pour l'analyse, les quatre syndicats furent regroupés parce que leurs 
structures administratives et hiérarchiques étaient les mêmes, que tous étaient assu-
jettis à la même convention collective de base, qu'ils se trouvaient dans le même 
milieu juridique, économique et politique et qu'il n'y avait pas de différences mar-
quées dans leur fonctionnement. Les mesures comprenaient l'assistance aux assem-
blées, l'engagement dans d'autres activités du syndicat, la participation informelle, 
la participation aux décisions portant sur 11 questions, l'influence sur ces questions, 
le contrôle électoral, le degré de sensibilisation des dirigeants aux intérêts des mem-
bres sur 12 questions et, enfin, l'appréciation de la structure de contrôle du syndicat. 
Les résultats démontrent, on peut le voir par le tableau 1, que, selon le critère 
choisi, les syndicats peuvent être considérés comme plus ou moins démocratiques. 
Les membres assistent très peu aux assemblées, participent à peu d'activités, 
s'engagent peu dans la prise de décision et n'y exercent guère d'influence. Ils ne 
semblent pas non plus recourir aux méthodes informelles de participation. Seules les 
variables qui ont trait au contrôle électoral et au degré de sensibilisation des 
dirigeants se rapprochent du milieu de l'échelle. Un examen plus attentif des mesures 
individuelle révèle que les membres estimaient qu'il y avait plus de démocratie, soit là 
où elle n'exigeait que peut d'initiative de leur part: participation aux élections, lec-
ture du journal et soit là où des mécanismes formels existaient pour obtenir l'action 
des membres: participation aux décisions relatives aux projets de conventions collec-
tives, votes de grève, acceptation ou rejet des contrats, détermination de la politique 
du syndicat. 
Les corrélations entre les différents critères de la démocratie syndicale sont ex-
posées dans le deuxième tableau. En règle générale, ils sont reliés l'un à l'autre d'une 
façon positive. Ainsi, plus les membres participent à l'activité syndicale, d'une 
manière formelle ou informelle, plus il y a de décisions auxquelles ils participent. Par 
ailleurs, la participation à la prise des décisions augmente en retour l'importance de 
l'influence sur les décisions. Les membres ressentent que les dirigeants sont plus sen-
sibilisés là où le processus d'élections est dynamique et démocratique et les membres 
participent et ont davantage d'influence sur les décisions du syndicat. Enfin, plus les 
membres ont d'influence sur les décisions majeures du syndicat plus le degré de sen-
sibilisation des dirigeants envers leurs intérêts est marqué, plus démocratique 
apparaît la structure de contrôle du syndicat. Le premier graphique présente ces 
constatations d'une façon schématique. 
Pour établir la contribution des échelles du critère de démocratie à la structure 
de contrôle du syndicat, on a estimé une équation de régression multiple dont les 
résultats apparaissent au troisième tableau. Quatre variables apportent des additions 
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significatives aux variances expliquées dans la structure de contrôle du syndicat. Plus 
les membres ont d'influence sur la prise des décisions, plus la structure de contrôle 
du syndicat est démocratique. Plus les membres recourent aux méthodes informelles 
de participation, plus est marquée l'influence relative des membres sur la façon dont 
le syndicat est dirigé. Chose intéressante, la troisième variable qui apporte une addi-
tion significative à la variance expliquée, soit la participation à d'autres activités syn-
dicales (poste de direction, membre de comité, vote dans les élections) réduit l'in-
fluence relative des membres. Il en ressort que les membres, qui sont actifs dans ces 
types d'activités syndicales, occupent un rang plus élevé dans la hiérarchie syndicale 
et considèrent que les membres sont moins engagés dans la direction du syndicat. En-
fin, plus les dirigeants se sentent responsables envers les membres, plus est 
démocratique la structure de contrôle du syndicat. Les autres critères de la démocra-
tie à l'intérieur du syndicat n'ont pas de signification. 
Les résultats de cette étude font voir la nécessité de considérer la démocratie syn-
dicale, non pas en tant qu'une suite de critères isolés mais plutôt comme un pro-
cessus, grâce auquel les membres sont capables d'influencer les résultats des pro-
blèmes majeurs qui les touchent. Aussi, la recherche, à l'avenir, devrait-elle s'at-
tacher plus directement au processus décisionnel à l'intérieur des syndicats. 
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